Uganda Today Edition: A Citizen’s Uncensored Views On The Role Of The Army In Causing Political Instability in Uganda: The acts of Legality versus Legitimacy

By Onono Fred Bilamoi

12th February 2025

 “Uganda is reaping from what the first executive Prime Minister Dr Apollo Milton Obote sowed in using the army to keep himself in power amid the challenges of the waning legitimacy at certain points in time during his first tenure at the helm” Mzee Tiberio Okeny Atwoma (Jan. 2009) (former DP national vice Chairman and the President General of NLP)

 This article is grounded on the scholarly works of political historians, Profesors. Ginyera-Pinycwa, S.R. Karugire, J. B. Mujaju,, M. Mamdani, A.  Nsibambi, A.A. Mazrui and above all Prof Ogenga Otunnu

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For Quite a while, Ugandans were gripped with anxiety while waiting for the Supreme Court Ruling in a case whereby the Attorney General had appealed to the Supreme Court, on an earlier Constitutional Court ruling which stopped the trying of civilians in the army courts such as the General Court Martial (GCM) and other military tribunals. The day came to pass with a victory on the side of the Human Rights Defenders and opposition politicians who regarded the practice as the violations of the fundamental rights to fair trials. But the regime supporters and apologists have castigated the ruling which they consider to have opened the floodgate for insecurity in the country and this has led to some reactions from various stakeholders especially from those who matter in the echelon of political power like the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) Spokesperson Col Chris Magezi, the CDF himself and the finally the President who is also the Commander in Chief (CiC) of the Uganda Armed Forces who castigated the ruling. During the recent Tarehe Sita Army celebration in Kyotera, the CDF who also doubles as the First Son described the Supreme Court ruling as, ‘very unfortunate and unacceptable’! Where does this leave the country? Is it not writing the same script using a different pen?

It should be noted that Uganda has had a very bad political history because of the abuse of the army in the body politics of the country. That is why in the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic Of Uganda, 1995 states that: “We the People of Uganda: Recalling our history which has been characterized by political and constitutional instability; Recognizing our struggles against the forces of tyranny, oppression and exploitation; Committed to building a better future by establishing a socio-economic and political order through a popular and durable national Constitution based on the principles of unity, peace, equality, democracy, freedom, social justice and progress…”

Civilians are not being tried in the Military Court world over with the exception of a few politically and democratically unstable countries like India with the Indian Army Act (1947), Bangladesh Martial Law (1952) and Sri Lankan Army Act which were inherited from Indian system after getting their independence, and the Egyptian Article 204 of their Constitution also allows the trial of civilians in Army Court since the time of Arab springs of 2013. Otherwise, there are no other countries in the world which subject their civilian citizens to the army court martial or military disciplinary tribunal. And the big question is what could be inspiring Uganda to think of embracing this archaic and primitive practice? Can’t any of those kind of suspects be taken to the civilian court and prosecuted successfully?

The background for the interference of the Army in the judicial system in Uganda

The practice of trying civilians in the military courts in Uganda traces its origin to the colonial power administrations but became more pronounced during the Idi Amin era where the government legalized it through decrees and it became an instrument of political violence used when the regime is being challenged politically. The previous governments also attempted to avoid possible legal embarrassment by exerting pressure on judges and magistrates to rule against suspected regime challengers. Thus, the efforts to influence court rulings variously also led to the several appointments of some supporters of the regime as civil judges and magistrates. The most dramatic and profound strategy those governments adopted to address the severe crisis of legitimacy were the establishment of alternative courts, the military tribunal. A few examples will shed light on how and why regime violence was legalized. Prof Ogenga Otunnu in his book, ‘The Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1890 to 1979’ noted that some of the past regimes in Uganda used the military courts to try their political opponents. He thus stated that:

“On March 17, 1971, the government of Uganda amended Penal Code Decree and the Armed Forces (Powers of Arrest Decree). These decrees gave members of the Armed forces and security agents unlimited legal powers to search any house, building, vehicle and aircraft for suspected opponents of the government. They could also arrest and detain any suspected opponent of the regime. The decrees also made “unlawful gatherings” a felony punishable by seven years imprisonment. On May 8, 1972, the government [of Uganda] passed another decree: the Proceedings against the Government (Protection Decree, Decree No. 8). This law provided retroactive legal immunity to the government and security agents: Notwithstanding any written or other law, no court shall make any decision, order or grant any remedy, relief in any proceedings against the government or any person acting under the authority of the government in respect of anything done or omitted to be done for the purpose of maintaining public order or public security in any part of Uganda, or for the defense of Uganda or for the enforcement of discipline or law and order or in respect of anything relating to, consequent upon or incidental to any of these purposes, during the period between the 24th day of January 1971 and such date as the president shall appoint…. It continued that, “These unlimited legal powers were expanded by the Detention Decree and Decree suspending political activities in the country similar to the Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986. Judicial political violence was further expanded when the regime established an alternative court, the Military Tribunal (MT), in 1973. The MT was established by the Defence Council under Decree No. 12 of 1973. The decree gave it sweeping powers to try both civilians and soldiers accused of treason. On June 26 and 27, 1973, Amin signed the Security Decrees which empowered the MT to try cases which had always fallen within the competent jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.

He also ordered the military to be tough on “subversive elements” and “ordinary criminals.” At the time of its creation, the MT was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Juma Oris (nicknamed, “Butabika”: the most unpopular psychiatric clinic in the country). The other members of the MT were: Captain Sebi Ali (nicknamed: “Kill me Quick”), Captain Fulgyensio K. Byabagambi, Captain Kiharamagara Karugye and Lieutenant Nyati Kabagwire. According to the ICJ, the “presiding officers of the tribunal do not possess even an elementary knowledge of the law; their only qualifications is that they are trusted friends of President Amin and can be relied upon to convict whoever is unfortunate to be taken before them.” Imagine such unlearned people to handle cases that involve even death penalty! Now, compare these soldiers with the personnel in the current Military Court Martial; it can rightly be concluded that history is just unfolding itself before our own eyes! And one may wonder what would be the reason that stops us from learning from our bad history.

The establishment of the alternative court during Idi Amin, which coincided with increased insurgencies, and opposition in the army, was intended to address the crisis of legitimacy in three related ways. First, send a clear message to perceived regime challengers that they would not be accorded the “luxury” of legal safeguards. In this instance, rules of procedure and evidence, and the burden and standard of proof would be determined by the regime MT. The accused would also be denied the “luxury” of representation by legal counsel. Secondly, of the regime obtain rulings which would have the desired effects of deterring and possibly eliminating opposition to the legitimacy.

Thirdly, end the growing criticisms that security officers and local administrators were interfering with the independence of the court by demanding the release of their supporters and friends, and demanding the prosecution of their opponents and perceived opponents of the regime. There is virtually no difference with the reasoning of the current regime. The first group of people to be tried by the MT was those arrested during the guerrilla activities in early 1973. Most of them were “found” guilty of treason and were taken to their home districts where they were executed by firing squads. The executions took place in the presence of thousands of people, including family members of the primary targets.

For instance, on February 10, 1973, an estimated 30,000 people watched the public execution of Badru Semakula in Kampala near Clock Tower. Immediately after the execution, a military spokesperson told the nation that the public execution sent a clear message of deterrence to Ugandans: “that involvement in guerrilla activities means loss of life. That is why it was decided that these guerillas be executed by firing squad. Therefore anybody found engaging in guerrilla activities or harboring guerillas will be headed [sic] for real danger.” A similar message was echoed the following day by the Commanding Officer of the Second Paratrooper Battalion at Port Portal. He added that “guerillas had been sent to every district in Uganda yet Chiefs had not reported them. Chiefs would face the same fate as the guerillas if they did not alert the authorities about terrorists.” After similar executions in Acholi, Radio Uganda reported a warning issued by the Base Commander of Air Force in Gulu that the local community “would be wiped out if they joined the ‘guerillas.’” Likewise in Lango, the District Commissioner conveyed a similar warning: “if need be, the whole parish or Gombolola (an administrative sub-district) would be destroyed if guerillas living there were not reported.”

Between August 23 and September 5, 1977, the MT carried out one of its most publicized trials. The trials took place in a public forum at the City Hall in Kampala. A total of 16 people were tried for treason. Out of these, only two people, John Ejura (a proprietor and principal of Aboke High School in Lango) and Apollo Lawoko (controller of programmes, ministry of information), were acquitted. Two other people, John Obimu and Boy Lango, were each sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The rest, E.N. Mutabazi, Peter Atua, Daniel Nsereko, Lieutenant Ben Ogwang, Y. Y. Okot, John Leji Olobo, Elias Okidi-Menya, Abdallah Anyuru, Ben Ongom, Peter Adupa and Gerisom Onono, were sentenced to death, and were subsequently taken to their home districts to face public executions by firing squad. Why should Uganda degenerate into this dark abyss and the dredged up memories again when it can be avoided | the juxtaposition of the actions of the past and present regimes are just stark and unforgiving!

Abuse of the Army in the politics of Uganda: The historical perspectives

Uganda has experienced the bouts of political turmoil because of the abuse of the army by either erroneously or directly involving the army in the governance of the state. But this is not what was intended by the fathers of western democracy and good governance when they founded democracy; the major roles of the army are to be limited to the territorial protections of the State and making intervention when a natural disasters or calamities befall the country.

Let’s try to review a few cases in Uganda when the regimes tried to hybridize governance between militarism and popular democracy: When on December 31, 1960, the Buganda government declared its independence; the Colonial government was threatened by that act. So, in order to prevent the issues of secession of Buganda from the rest of Uganda, they responded by enacting the Prevention of Intimidation Bill which was expressly executed by the colonial army.

The Legal but Illegitimate Obote’s Regime: any lesson learnt ?

When Obote imposed the implementations of the recommendation by the Molson Commission that a referendum be held in the two Lost Counties any time after two years of independence, he acted within the law and although the view was very unpopular within Buganda region, he enforced it with the firm hands by using the army. Accordingly, on August 24, 1964, he formally (legally) dissolved the KY\UPC alliance and after the formal dissolution of the alliance, the passage of the referendum Bill followed in September 1964 amid heavy military deployment around Parliament similar to the instances when President Museveni was to removing both ‘Term’ and ‘Age’ limits. But in the latter case, the military deployments didn’t only occur outside the Parliamentary precinct but inside the chamber.

During the high-end tensions which ensued during the passing of the referendum bill in the Parliament, the misuse of the army was done by the then president, Sir Edward Mutesa when he mobilized the section of the army who did not support  Obote’s  move and were in support of the Kabaka and they planned to counter Obote. The section of the army the Kabaka identified for the project was that led by the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), Brigadier Shaban Opolot. This segment of the army was chosen because its leader was married to the daughter of the former Chief Minister of Buganda and secondly he didn’t like Obote. On August 21, 1964, Mutesa, Katikiro Kintu and the rest of the Buganda government responded by passing a resolution to delegitimize the Bill. This was where hell broke loose and the army was let against the protesting population.

Another example of the incidence for the abuse of the army by the authority in power was in May 1965, when the plot to overthrow Obote by the army was actively being pursued by Brigadier Opolot and his group in the army. This group planned to assassinate Obote during the Independence celebration on October 9, 1965. On the eve of the celebration, Majors Kaku, Kanutie, Katabarwa and Ssenkooto drew arms and ammunition from Mbuya Army Headquarters to execute the plan. But the plan failed because it was leaked by an insider from among the plotters.

After realizing that there was plot to overthrow him, on February 22, 1966 (at 5.00 am), Obote summoned his close aides and planned the arrest of the coup leaders: Ibingira, Magezi, Lumu, Ngobi and Kirya. The only way the five ministers could be arrested at the same time, Obote and his aides reasoned, was to call a cabinet meeting at the State House in Entebbe. Accordingly, a cabinet meeting was called. Towards the end of the meeting, the police backed by the army, under direct order from Obote, stormed the Cabinet Room and without arrest warrants, arrested the five ministers. The ministers were rushed to the High Court and then deported to Patiko Prison in Gulu. They were however charged (in civil Court) with conducting themselves in a manner dangerous to peace and good order in Uganda.

The rulings were in favor of the Ministers who were ‘found not guilty’. The government respected the independence of the court: brought the five ex-ministers to Entebbe and released them. As soon as this legal requirement was met, the government rearrested and detained the five men under the Emergency Order which had been imposed in Buganda. This time, the arrest and detention without trial was LEGAL because of the Emergency Order. This is very similar to what the NRM regime did to several ‘suspects’ including the late Hon Mohamed Ssegirinya (former MP of Kawempe North) who were on trial in the military court.

Like in the current regime of Gen Museveni, this form of political violence highlighted one of the pitfalls of defining the phenomenon as an illegal act of violence by either the state or non-state actors. This wave of repressive measures was intended to terrorize Obote’s opponents into silence, thereby providing the regime with ‘security’ and ‘stability’. Unfortunately for Obote, the measures made him feel more threatened because his opponents who were still at large appeared, to Obote and his close circle of supporters, to be even more determined to topple him. Rather than wait to be toppled, Obote carried out his own coup on February 22, 1966 by taking “over all powers of the Government of Uganda” to preserve “national stability and national security.”

In this instance, Obote justified escalating violence against his perceived challengers by focusing attention on the elusive, but cherished notions of NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS. The justifications he provided implied an affinity between the aspirations of the masses and the survival of his rule. From that moment, Obote’s interests and security like the current Museveni’s interests would be presented as national interests and national security. According to Prof O. Otunnu this legitimist ideology, political violence by the regime was justified because it protected “national security” and “national interests.” This ideology eroded the distinction between the government and the state, and between Obote and the state.

Like any other enlightened autocrat, Obote had his justifications. This was Obote’s justifications for his actions, he said: “Events and unwelcome activities of certain leading personalities have led me to take drastic measures to ensure stability, unity and order in the country…. During my tour in the Northern Region early this month, an attempt was made to overthrow the Government by foreign troops. Some foreign missions stationed in Uganda were requested by persons who hold positions in the Government under the Constitution of Uganda. These requests were made outside the provisions of the Constitution and were for massive military assistance consisting of foreign soldiers and arms.

It is for this fundamental reason that I now announce measures which are to take effect immediately to ensure our dignity as a country and people, to preserve our sovereignty and stability, and to set a strong basis for law and order, and prosperity. The Constitution shall be suspended temporarily with the effect from 7 o’clock tonight…” He concluded his statement by declaring that President Muteesa had disqualified himself from holding any national office because of his anti-Uganda tendencies.

Thereafter, on March 1, 1966, the regime banned all press conferences, public meetings and rallies on the grounds that they threatened national security, national unity and other national interests. From that moment, substantive distinctions between a civilian regime and a military regime began to gradually disappear not only in Buganda but in Uganda at large. During this time, the army stood out tall and bold and ensured that all Obote’s opponents and enemies are subdued in a cruel underbelly but Obote himself remained hauntingly ambitious and yet paralysingly insecure without the presence of the army.

So, on February 24, 1966, Obote dismissed President Muteesa and suspended all the relevant clauses in the 1962 constitution that dealt with the powers, rights and privileges of the office of the president and vice-president. The new constitution was adopted without a debate but it was LEGAL. This made it possible for Obote to complete his constitutional coup and take the oath of the office of President on August 15, 1966. However, this judicial legitimacy, which was imposed through terror and dictatorship, increased the severe crisis of legitimacy. Indeed, the Buganda government responded by formally withdrawing its support for, and recognition of, Obote and the Uganda government. This marked the moment for the birth of what we are going through politically in the country.

According to Prof O. Otunnu, “To make its position more credible, The Buganda Kingdom mobilized its followers, including Baganda ex- servicemen, to destroy properties of the Uganda government, attack the police and the military, and terrorize supporters of the regime in Buganda. This was followed by a declaration that Buganda recognized only the 1962 constitution because it conformed to its interests, values and beliefs.” It then approached the High Court to vindicate its position. However, the court ruled that the new constitution was the only legitimate and valid constitution in the country.

The regime responded to the threat in a manner similar to that of the colonial regime: when in May 18, 1966, it legally outlawed the boycott using the Penal Code. The reasons it gave for the repressive measure were also similar to those of the colonial regime: the boycott was intended to bring about hatred and disaffection, jeopardize the economy and undermine the government’s lawful authority. The strategies adopted and the reasons given for the repressive measure were similar because both regimes faced a similar problem: a severe crisis of legitimacy. The only difference was that the Obote regime had some legitimacy among segments of the population outside the Buganda. The use of the repressive Penal Code, however, increased instability and political violence in Buganda. It also forced anti-regime challengers to develop complex networks of clandestine operations. But Obote after realizing that his power longevity depended on the firm grip of the army, he consolidated this by promoting his right hand soldier Idi Amin to a higher rank and made him the army commander.

Entrenching the culture of using the army in Ugandan politics:

Idi Amin did a similar thing to Obote when he violently overthrew Obote from power on 25^th Jan 1971 when he was out of the country attending the CHOGM in Singapore. Idi Amin was subsequently overthrown by a combined TPDF army and Ugandan refugees exiled in Tanzania who formed the UNLA\F. After the Amin overthrow, Professor Yusuf K. Lule was sworn in as president of Uganda on 13^th April 1979 but was again deposed off on the 20^th June 1979 by the Paul Mwanga led Military Commission whose leadership was to rotate among these members on Monthly basis and they included Yoweri Museveni, Oyite Ojok, Tito Okello, Zeddy Maruru,William Omaria, Steven Kashaka, Joram Mugume, Pecos Kutesa and Opon Smith Acak. After Lule, Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa was appointed as the president of Uganda by the military backed National Consultative Commission (NCC) and sworn in on 20^th June 1979 and again he was deposed on the 10^th May 1980 by the army when he tried to post the liberation hero and the all-powerful military man Maj. Gen Oyite Ojok to Algeria as an Ambassador. Immediately after the deposing of president Binaisa, Paul Mwanga of the Military Commission took over the country leadership 12^th May 1980 to 22^nd May 1980 (for ten days then he resigned). The Presidential Commission (Saulo Musoke, Polycarp Nyamuchoncho, Yoweri Hunter Wacha Olwol) took over from 22^nd May to 15^th December 1980.

Obote took over from 17^th Dec 1980 to 27^th July 1985 when he was deposed by Gen Okello Tito who was later overthrown by Gen Yoweri K. Museveni on 26^th Jan 1986 who is ruling to-date. So, if we go through the political mileage of the country’s journey and try to do the juxtaposition of Uganda’s past and present from 1894 to date, we find that the role of the military in governance cannot be understated nor underrated. But the trend must change to guarantee Ugandans the real peace generated from true democracy.

Lessons Learnt:

This is Uganda’s watershed moment and the need for positive intervention cannot be overstated. Uganda’s needs for a smooth democratic and peaceful transition from president Museveni to the next president is what Ugandans wants to witness no matter who that person would be. The tendency with which the regime responded to political situation in 1966 by imposing a restrictive laws like ‘State of Emergency’ and a ‘dusk to dawn curfew’ throughout Buganda should be avoided at all cost. Increased regime terror and repression will not dissuade the citizens to scale down their opposition to the regime but will breed further hatred and rebellion instead. No people can be ruled forcefully at gunpoint.

The citizens must accept to relinquish parts of their rights and privileges in exchange to protection, peace and service delivery in all sectors in what is called social contract. The best alternative for Uganda to come out of the current stalemate is to have a conversation on how a structured political consensus can be reached at (in the DP Mao’s formula of having a consensus built through national dialogue, electoral reform which would culminate into a smooth presidential transition and FORGIVENESS would be the key aspect) that can help to diffuse more bloodshed, contain political instability and prevent the country from disintegrating or even stop it from turning into a police state or an anarchy.

The reasons why the past regimes valued the repressive laws like the Obote’s Detention Regulations or even the trying of civilians in the Military Court is because it unjustly and unfairly gives them political advantage over the suppressed opponents. It also gives them the leverage to detain people in respect of whom it has no evidence that can satisfy a court of law that they have committed an offense… thus creating impunity. This means the enthronement of the police state or military dictatorship. While the imposition of the repressive laws can bring about ‘stability’ in the country, they will not address the profound legitimization deficit and dilemma but will provoke a series of legal challenges and political instability in the country.

The use of the army to protect the status quo under the pretext of keeping internal security, combating insurgencies, fighting terrorism and illegal arms possession among civilians is Uganda’s biggest undoing in the areas of human rights violations and creating impunity. Unfortunately, it is not sustainable in the long run. A president like Gen Museveni may mean well for Uganda but his approach to achieve that feat may not be the universally and democratically acceptable one because of the shrewdness.

In the similar manner Obote wanted to lead a united and unitary government in Uganda but along the way he met resistance from feudalists and monarchists from Buganda who wanted either domination or secession and he had to deal with them with iron fists but the negative consequences of those decisions still haunts the country as the Baganda regarded the move as a cynical ploy to destroy Buganda. Likewise, much as president Museveni may want to see the real socio-economic transformation of Uganda, his highhandedness in achieving it should not overshadow the noble motive intended otherwise history will judge him very harshly.

Dr Apollo Milton Obote’s political dilemmas

Ugandan leaders must avoid Obote’s cunningness of trying to hybridize civilian democratic rule with militarism and legality as opposed to legitimacy. Even as he was presenting his proposed constitution to parliament, military troops were patrolling the city and war planes were hovering over Buganda. In this environment of terror and repression, Obote was preoccupied with power retention even if it was devoid of any legality. President Obote’s democratic credibility was further dented when in 1969, he argued that in order to create national integration and stability, Uganda should become a one party state with the slogan of ‘one people, one country, one parliament and one government’ through a constitutional means in what was known as the ‘move to the left’ He did this in stack fear of political competition. Much as this was tenable, deep inside, Obote knew that he was losing legitimacy although he had a strong power grip through the military. Instead of using consensus building through the constitution as a vehicle for stability, he resorted to the use of military. And he insisted that some aspects of liberty and democracy would have to be frozen until when the country gets to the appropriate evolutionary stage to open up. This created a lot of anger among the population who saw that they were being disenfranchised by the Obote’s regime.

In a similar manner, the anger within the population especially within Buganda against the current NRM government has now reached such a pitch that many think that they would rather die than live under a totalitarian regime where all that they live for is meaningless…thus the popularizing of the phrase by NUP supporters that, ‘we are in the struggle to remove the dictator’ It appears the Museveni’s government is targeting the Baganda for voting wrongly during the 2021 elections when they overwhelmingly voted NUP. But due to political dynamism, there could have been a reason for that voting pattern which can still change in favor of the ruling party if the conditions change.

We know that the MK Gen being the product of military revolution (in his own fashion) wants to consolidate the achievements of the Mzee by maintaining the country’s ‘stability’ but he should avoid the type of stability which does not stem from legitimacy but mere legality which however rests on the shifting sand. Equally, while competent terror and repression may bring about stability, they increase the severe crisis of legitimacy.

The young General must prove to Ugandans that he can become the president of Uganda purely on his own merit and not riding on the Mzee’s legacy. He is entitled to that constitutional right to become the president of Uganda as enshrined in Articles 61 and 178 but should not try to violate the same constitution while in pursuit of that dream. It is becoming clear that he has a sizable support among the young people gauging by the social media and also by the kind of demonstration witnessed today (Mon 10^th Feb) when the supporters were marching to Parliament of Uganda to deliver a protest letter to the Speaker of Parliament. He should know how to manage such supporters otherwise Ugandans may witness gangsters-style street fights with a rival political youth groups. He should also avoid things like participating in open partisan politics when still serving in the UPDF. He should also prove that he will abide by the constitutional dictate of being submissive to civilian authority and avoid defying for example, the Parliamentary call for him to go and explain his social media posts threatening Opposition political leaders like Robert Kyagulanyi and Dr Kizza Besigye… but instead of insulting the MPs calling them ‘clown and corrupt’, he should have listened to their call and addressed them appropriately by pointing out their weaknesses if any so that they correct themselves.

After the Supreme Court ruling against trying civilians in the military court, President Museveni became very furious and rejected the outcome of the ruling saying that ‘Uganda is not governed by the judges’ and vowed to overturn the ruling. Now that the NRM Caucus is preparing to amend this aspect of the constitution, they must avoid making retrospective legislation for the purposes of circumventing the recent Supreme Court ruling on the trial of civilian in the Military Court as it is being planned.

Power is an integral dynamic of politics which must be protected by the politicians and institutions responsible like the judiciary etc but at the moment, the judiciary is under fire from the Executive when the president erroneously stated that, Uganda is not governed by the Judges but by the people through their representatives negating the doctrine of separation of power.

The Onus is now on the MPs to help in maintaining the rule of law and protecting the citizen’s rights. Otherwise such a proclamation by the head of state is an affront to the principle judiciary independence and constitutional governance. Experience however shows that the MPs love transactional politics and it is most likely that they would yield to the executive demands of reversing the Supreme Court ruling so that civilians are tried in military courts.

But the MPs should know that they can easily become the victims of this legislation as any of their political opponents can easily frame them and they will find themselves caught up in their own web. If they find it hard to resist the executive onslaughts on the matter, then they should refer the matter for a referendum.

The NRM MPs should not let the gap between citizens’ expectations and what should be delivered to them on this matter to be so large that it leads to a profound disappointment among the voting masses that they gradually begin to withdraw their consent, trust and obligations from both the politicians and the regime. It happened during both the ‘Term’ and ‘Age’ limit removal legislations. So, it must not repeat itself again. Let the Museveni regime struggle to search for its true hegemony over Ugandans instead of you the MPs giving him that false legitimacy. Legitimacy in governance is the necessary preconditions to get to the democratic “promised land” of national integration, liberal democracy, liberty and socio-economic transformation and development.

The current Ugandan MPs have enabled the emergence of a form of political practice that helped to transform a despotically strong but infrastructural weak regime. Their acts of betrayal to the voters have also helped to erode the infrastructural power of the state because they no longer represent the views and interests of the ordinary voters down there but their own pecuniary interests. The infrastructural power of the state, like the stability of the state, rests on its ability to control the society not through bribery, violence, coercion and intimidation but through consensus of social contract. But what exists in Uganda at the moment is the fallacy of social contract. Let Ugandans say no to military court trying of the civilians because it denies them the due process, breed unfair trials, prolonged detentions and lack of independent legal representations among others. Uganda should struggle to maintain legitimate rule of law and protecting citizens’ rights.

The writer is a Social Critic, Public Policy analyst and an Expert on Governance

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