When Legal Advice Meets The Court: The Tooro Succession Dispute And The Besigye Precedent

UgandaToday: When Legal Advice Meets The Court: The Tooro Succession Dispute And The Besigye Precedent

What Uganda’s Past Dispute Over Besigye’s Eligibility Can Teach Us About The Present Contest Over The Tooro Throne

Uganda’s 2005 Besigye nomination controversy and the current Tooro succession dispute are legally different cases, but both raise a fundamental constitutional question: where does legal advice end and authoritative determination begin?

By Uganda Today Editorial Desk

The unfolding succession dispute in the Tooro Kingdom has moved beyond a disagreement among members of the royal family and into a much larger constitutional and legal conversation: Who ultimately determines the meaning and application of the law when an Attorney General’s opinion, traditional authority and competing claims collide?

That question has acquired particular significance following a September 12, 2026 legal opinion by Attorney General Dr Sam Mayanja to President Yoweri Museveni concerning the succession to the Tooro throne.

Mayanja reportedly advised that the late Omukama Oyo Nyimba Kabamba Iguru Rukidi IV’s will should guide the succession process and that the validity of the will could only be challenged in a court of law. He also advised that the disputed succession question should be resolved before the Government formally recognises a successor.

Yet the Tooro Kingdom has continued with its own institutional process.

On September 15, the Tooro Supreme Council formally endorsed Prince Edward Rukidi Kijanangoma Nyabongo I as successor to the late King Oyo, following his selection by the Babiito Royal Clan. The Babiito leadership has subsequently announced September 29, 2026 as the proposed date for his coronation at Karuziika Palace.

The Government, however, has not yet gazetted Kijanangoma as king. The Attorney General has maintained that formal recognition should await resolution of the dispute.

It is against this background that Uganda’s experience during the 2005–2006 presidential election provides an important, although not identical, constitutional lesson.

The Besigye Question: When The Attorney General’s Advice Met An Independent Institution

In late 2005, Dr Kizza Besigye was facing serious criminal charges and was being held on remand at Luzira Prison when the presidential nomination period approached.

The then Attorney General, Prof Khiddu Makubuya, advised against his nomination in absentia. Contemporary accounts record that Makubuya argued that Besigye’s circumstances made him legally different from the other presidential candidates and that he should be physically present for nomination.

The Electoral Commission disagreed.

The Commission proceeded to nominate Besigye while he was in custody.

The dispute then moved to the Constitutional Court. In February 2006, the court dismissed a petition seeking to invalidate his nomination, holding that his nomination in absentia did not contravene the Constitution or the Presidential Elections Act. The court also emphasised the constitutional independence of the Electoral Commission and rejected the proposition that the Commission was bound by the Attorney General’s advice.

That historical episode matters today for a reason larger than the politics surrounding Besigye.

It demonstrated a fundamental principle of constitutional government:

An Attorney General gives legal advice; a court determines contested questions of law when they properly come before it.

The Attorney General’s office is immensely important, but an opinion from that office does not automatically become a judicial determination.

That distinction is central to understanding the present Tooro controversy.

The Important Difference: Tooro Is Not An Election

It would nevertheless be misleading to suggest that the Tooro succession dispute is simply another version of the Besigye case.

It is not.

Besigye’s dispute concerned constitutional qualifications and the powers of an independent constitutional body—the Electoral Commission.

The Tooro dispute concerns succession to a traditional institution governed by the Constitution, legislation, customs, traditions and the internal institutions of the kingdom.

Article 246 of the Constitution recognises traditional and cultural institutions, while defining a traditional or cultural leader as one who derives allegiance from birth or descent in accordance with customs, traditions, usage or the consent of the people led by that institution. The Constitution also provides that such institutions do not exercise governmental administrative, legislative or executive powers. (ULII)

The Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Act, 2011 similarly provides that installation must derive from birth or descent in accordance with the Constitution, customs, traditions, usage or consent of the people concerned. (ULII)

Therefore, the Tooro question cannot properly be reduced to whether the President supports one claimant or another.

The deeper issue is:

What does Tooro custom require, what does Ugandan law require, and what happens when the two sides disagree about the facts upon which those rules must operate?

The Will At The Centre Of The Dispute

At the heart of the present controversy is the alleged will of the late King Oyo.

According to reports of the Attorney General’s opinion, the will provides for succession by a biological son if the late king had a legally recognised son capable of succeeding him, with another succession arrangement contemplated if there was no such son.

Members of the late king’s immediate family have relied upon the will in challenging the succession process.

The Babiito Royal Clan, on the other hand, proceeded through its succession mechanism and eventually selected Kijanangoma after its earlier choice, George Desmond Kamurasi, declined the throne. The Supreme Council subsequently endorsed Kijanangoma.

This creates two separate questions which should not be confused.

The first is whether the will exists and is authentic.

The second is whether the will legally and customarily determines succession to the Tooro throne.

There is also a factual question of whether the alleged son exists and, if so, whether he satisfies the legal and customary requirements for succession.

These are questions of evidence, law and custom—not simply questions of political preference.

Why The Attorney General Has Pointed Towards Court

The reported advice of the Attorney General is significant precisely because it recognises the limits of an administrative or advisory solution.

If one party says a will exists and another disputes either its validity or its effect, an Attorney General cannot simply manufacture evidence establishing the truth.

A court can receive evidence, hear competing parties, examine the legal validity of documents and make binding orders.

This is particularly important where the dispute affects the legal status of an institution that, under Article 246, is a corporation sole capable of suing and being sued and holding property in trust for the institution and the people concerned. (ULII)

The law therefore creates an important distinction between recognising a traditional institution and determining a disputed legal claim concerning that institution.

The first involves the constitutional and statutory framework.

The second may require adjudication.

But Who Should Go To Court?

This is perhaps the most intriguing question arising from the Attorney General’s latest position.

If the Government’s position is that the person challenging the succession should go to court, then the obvious question is whether the Government itself can remain entirely outside the dispute while withholding formal recognition.

The Attorney General has reportedly stated that the Government will not gazette Kijanangoma until the succession dispute is resolved.

That position creates an interesting constitutional dynamic.

The kingdom’s traditional organs say they have followed their customs and selected a successor.

The aggrieved side says the process disregarded the late king’s will.

The Attorney General says the will should guide succession unless successfully challenged.

The Government has not yet gazetted the selected successor.

And the kingdom’s Supreme Council has now endorsed him.

The result is a legal and institutional gap between selection, installation, recognition and judicial determination.

Those concepts are not necessarily synonymous.

The Besigye Lesson: Advice Is Not Judgment

This is where the Besigye episode offers Uganda an important historical reference point.

The 2005 dispute demonstrated that an Attorney General’s advice can be contested by another constitutionally established institution.

The Electoral Commission did not accept Makubuya’s advice.

The matter went to court.

The Constitutional Court ruled that the Commission was independent and was not legally required to follow the Attorney General’s advice.

This does not mean that every Attorney General’s opinion is wrong.

Nor does it mean that every institution is free to ignore legal advice.

It means something more precise:

Legal advice and judicial determination perform different constitutional functions.

An Attorney General advises.

An independent institution exercises powers assigned to it by law.

A court interprets the law when a justiciable dispute is brought before it.

That separation is one of the safeguards against concentrating legal authority in one office.

Was The Besigye Advice Simply “Wrong”?

This is where historical reporting requires care.

It is tempting, with hindsight, to say that the Attorney General was simply wrong in the Besigye matter.

The more accurate formulation is that the position advanced by the Attorney General did not prevail before the Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court dismissed the challenge to Besigye’s nomination and held that nomination in absentia was lawful. (Uganda Radionetwork)

Contemporary research also records that the Electoral Commission had rejected the Attorney General’s position and maintained that Besigye could be nominated while in detention. (ResearchGate)

That distinction matters.

A legal opinion is an argument based upon an interpretation of the law.

A judgment is an authoritative determination by a competent court.

One can therefore disagree with an Attorney General’s interpretation without implying that the Attorney General acted improperly simply because a court later took a different view.

The Presumption Of Innocence Also Matters

There is another important lesson from the Besigye episode.

Besigye’s being on trial did not amount to a conviction.

The Constitutional Court’s ruling on his nomination occurred against the background of pending criminal proceedings.

That distinction is fundamental to the rule of law.

A person facing criminal charges remains legally distinct from a person who has been convicted.

Indeed, the contemporary record shows that the attempt to prevent Besigye’s nomination on the basis of his detention generated a major constitutional dispute precisely because the law did not automatically transform pending accusations into a disqualification from presidential nomination.

The broader principle is worth retaining:

Pending allegations are not the same thing as established facts, and an accusation is not a judgment.

That principle is relevant to the Tooro dispute as well.

Claims about a will, an alleged son, customary entitlement or the legitimacy of a succession process should be established through evidence rather than assumed because one faction asserts them.

Tooro’s More Difficult Constitutional Puzzle

The Tooro dispute presents a more complicated constitutional puzzle because Uganda’s Constitution deliberately recognises traditional institutions while limiting their governmental powers.

Article 246 allows traditional institutions to exist according to culture, customs and traditions. At the same time, it places those institutions within the constitutional order of Uganda. (ULII)

The Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Act further provides for the existence, installation, privileges and other aspects of traditional institutions. The Act also recognises the High Court as the relevant court for purposes of the legislation. (ULII)

This means Tooro’s customs matter.

But they operate within Uganda’s constitutional framework.

Neither constitutional law nor customary authority exists in a vacuum.

The Government’s Role Requires Particular Care

The role of the President is another area deserving careful scrutiny.

The President is the head of the central government, but the Constitution does not make the President the traditional kingmaker of Tooro.

Article 246 expressly recognises the autonomy of traditional institutions in their cultural sphere while simultaneously making clear that traditional leaders do not possess governmental executive, legislative or administrative powers. (ULII)

The State nevertheless has an important administrative role because the 2011 Act provides for publication of a traditional or cultural leader’s declaration in the Gazette by the responsible Minister. (ULII)

This creates a delicate balance.

The Government must administer the law concerning traditional institutions without becoming the substitute for the institution itself.

Equally, traditional institutions must exercise their authority consistently with the Constitution and applicable legislation.

The legitimacy of both sides ultimately depends upon respect for those boundaries.

The Risk Of Solving A Legal Dispute Through Political Authority

The history of constitutional government repeatedly demonstrates the dangers of resolving legal disputes merely through political authority.

Where the question is fundamentally legal, political intervention may temporarily suppress disagreement without actually resolving it.

The Tooro situation illustrates the problem.

If the Babiito Royal Clan proceeds with the coronation while the Government maintains that the succession remains legally unresolved, the dispute could continue beyond the ceremony.

If the Government prevents the traditional institution from proceeding without a court determination, questions could arise about the extent of central-government involvement in an institution constitutionally recognised as traditional and cultural.

If an aggrieved claimant goes to court, however, the judiciary would have an opportunity to determine the legal questions on evidence.

That may ultimately provide a clearer constitutional endpoint than competing public statements.

What A Court Could Potentially Clarify

Without prejudging any future litigation, a properly constituted court could potentially be asked to address questions such as:

1. Whether the alleged will is authentic and legally valid.
2. Whether the will is legally capable of determining succession to the Tooro throne.
3. Whether an alleged biological son exists and whether his status is sufficiently established.
4. What Tooro custom provides for succession where a reigning Omukama dies.
5. Whether the Babiito succession process complied with the applicable customs and statutory framework.
6. What legal effect should be attached to the selection and subsequent endorsement of Kijanangoma.
7. What role, if any, the Government should play before formal gazetting.

Those are questions better answered through evidence and law than through competing political declarations.

The Supreme Council’s Endorsement Changes The Equation—But Not Necessarily The Legal Question

The September 15 decision by the Tooro Supreme Council is significant.

It means Kijanangoma’s selection is no longer supported only by the initial succession committee. The kingdom’s Supreme Council has now formally endorsed it.

But the Attorney General’s position introduces another layer: the Government considers the succession dispute unresolved.

This creates an unusual situation in which the kingdom’s internal institutional process and the central government’s legal position are moving on parallel tracks.

The announcement of a September 29 coronation date makes the issue even more consequential.

The central question is no longer simply who has been selected.

It is whether selection alone settles succession when a competing claimant says a legally significant document—the late king’s will—was disregarded.

The Danger Of Turning The Dispute Into A Personal Contest

There is also a broader danger.

The debate should not be reduced to Queen Mother Best Kemigisa against the Babiito elders, or Kijanangoma against an alleged son.

That personalisation obscures the institutional question.

The real issue is the succession mechanism of an ancient cultural institution operating under a modern constitutional order.

The individuals involved will eventually pass from public attention.

The rules established through this dispute could remain relevant for future generations.

That is why the present controversy deserves more than partisan arguments.

It requires documentation.

It requires respect for Tooro custom.

It requires respect for the Constitution.

And where the facts remain disputed, it requires evidence.

The Besigye Precedent Offers A Warning Against Premature Finality

The Besigye experience should therefore not be invoked as proof that the current Attorney General is necessarily wrong.

Rather, it should serve as a warning against treating an executive legal opinion as the final word where a genuine legal dispute exists.

In 2005, an Attorney General’s advice did not end the nomination controversy.

The Electoral Commission disagreed.

The matter went to court.

The court ruled.

That sequence provided the constitutional system with an answer that an administrative opinion alone could not provide. (Uganda Radionetwork)

Tooro may now be approaching a similar institutional crossroads, albeit in a fundamentally different area of law.

If the dispute cannot be settled through the kingdom’s own recognised mechanisms, litigation may provide the forum in which competing claims can be tested.

A Court Is Not A Defeat For Tradition

Importantly, taking a succession dispute to court should not automatically be interpreted as an attack on Tooro culture.

Uganda’s Constitution itself recognises traditional institutions.

The Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Act gives such institutions legal personality and recognises their operation within Ugandan law. (ULII)

A court therefore does not necessarily replace custom.

It can be asked to determine whether the relevant custom, evidence and law have been correctly applied.

That distinction could be crucial in the Tooro case.

The Bigger Question For Uganda

Beyond Tooro and beyond Besigye lies a larger question about constitutionalism in Uganda:

What happens when respected institutions disagree over what the law requires?

The answer in a constitutional democracy should not depend upon the identity of the person involved.

It should depend upon the applicable law, evidence and institutional jurisdiction.

The Attorney General’s office is indispensable to government because the State needs authoritative legal advice.

Traditional institutions are important because Uganda’s Constitution expressly protects their cultural existence.

The courts are indispensable because disputes about rights, legal powers and the validity of competing claims ultimately require an institution capable of making binding determinations.

And the political leadership has a responsibility to respect the boundaries between those institutions.

The Tooro Test

The Tooro succession dispute therefore presents Uganda with an important institutional test.

The question is not merely whether Kijanangoma should be king.

Nor is it merely whether the late King Oyo’s alleged will should prevail.

The deeper question is how Uganda resolves a succession dispute when customary authority, a royal institution, an executive legal opinion and competing legal claims point in different directions.

The Attorney General has reportedly pointed towards the courts.

The Babiito Royal Clan has proceeded with its succession process.

The Supreme Council has endorsed Kijanangoma.

The Government has withheld formal gazetting pending resolution of the dispute.

And a coronation has been announced for September 29.

The next chapter may therefore determine more than the identity of Tooro’s next Omukama.

It could help define the practical relationship between custom, constitutional law, executive authority and judicial power in modern Uganda.

The Lesson From Besigye Is Ultimately About Institutions

The most useful lesson from the Besigye episode is not that one Attorney General was right or wrong.

It is that Uganda’s constitutional system worked through disagreement by allowing an independent institution to act and a court to adjudicate the resulting dispute.

That is the distinction Uganda should preserve in the Tooro matter.

Legal advice should be respected.

Traditional authority should be respected.

The President’s constitutional responsibilities should be respected.

But where a genuine legal dispute remains, the final answer should come from the institution legally empowered to determine it—not simply from the loudest claimant, the most powerful office-holder or the most influential faction.

For Tooro, the immediate challenge is therefore not simply to install a king.

It is to ensure that, when the next Omukama finally takes the throne, the process is sufficiently grounded in Tooro tradition and Uganda’s constitutional order that the legitimacy of the institution is strengthened rather than left permanently contested.

That may ultimately be the most important inheritance of the late King Oyo’s succession crisis.